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Imagine you are eighteen years old, you are a United States (“U.S.”) citizen 
living in the state of Georgia, and it is 2018. You have to be at work by 10:00 
a.m., so you wake up early to make sure you can place your vote and get to work. 
Around 8:00 a.m., you drive through the same suburban Atlanta neighborhood 
where your parents have always lived to the church where your parents took you 
growing up when they were voting. You arrive at the church to find that the 
precinct has been closed. A note on the door tells you that you may vote at a 
different polling place several miles away. Determined, you drive to the new 
precinct. When you arrive at 8:45 a.m., you see a line of more than two hundred 
people stretching down the sidewalk. You decide it will be fine if you are a few 
minutes late to work, so you park your car and get in line to vote. At 9:30 a.m., 
you are still over one hundred people away from the front of the line, so you have 
to ask your boss for the morning off work. You stand in line waiting for four 
hours. When you finally reach the front of the line, the poll workers tell you there 
is a problem. They cannot find your name on the list of registered voters. You 
express your confusion, explaining that you are a U.S. citizen, that you filled out 
your voter registration application accurately and submitted it on time, and that 
you have not moved since submitting your voter application. While the election 
workers understand your frustration, they say there is nothing they can do. They 
direct you to fill out a provisional ballot and let you know that your vote may or 
may not be counted.  
A week after the election, you call Georgia’s State Election Office to figure 
out why you were unable to place your vote using a traditional ballot. The woman 
who answers the phone lets you know that there was an error in your voter reg-
istration application and clarifies that your application did not match the infor-
mation in the state’s database. After looking into the issue, she tells you that there 
must have been a clerical error. She explains that someone must have acci-
dentally misspelled your name when entering the information into the state’s 
system, despite it being written correctly on your voter registration application. 
She apologizes and lets you know that your voter registration is now valid—a 
week after the deadline to cast your ballot in the 2018 election. 
The right to vote is the hallmark of a free society. It is the most important of 
all the civil liberties possessed by an individual in a representative democracy. 
Imagine that the situation above is your first time voting in an election; that it is 
your first time participating in the democratic process; and that your vote did not 
count. Are the impediments you experienced unreasonable? Have you been de-
prived of your right to vote? If so, would your experience constitute a violation 
of international human rights norms? 
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This Note explores the state of Georgia’s 2018 General Election to determine 
whether the state’s election procedures in place at the time violated international 
law.1 Part I of this Note discusses the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (“ICCPR”) and the obligations it places on member States—including 
the United States—to protect their respective citizens’ political rights under Ar-
ticle 25.2 Part II examines several of Georgia’s 2018 election procedures, which 
opponents argue may have suppressed the ability of legitimate citizen voters to 
exercise their right to vote. Part III considers whether these election procedures 
presented an unreasonable restriction on eligible Georgia citizens’ right to vote, 
which would put the United States in violation of international law under Article 
25 of the ICCPR. This Note concludes by offering recommendations for how the 
United States can best ensure that Georgia’s election procedures comply with the 
ICCPR in the future. This Note primarily seeks to provide guidance to U.S. fed-
eral, state, and local governments regarding best practices for ensuring effective 
implementation of its citizens’ right to political participation under the ICCPR. 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS 
 
It is important to note that “[t]he principle of universal and equal suffrage for 
all adult citizens constitutes one of the cornerstones of modern democracies.”3 
The Charter of the United Nations explains that one of the organization’s pur-
poses is “to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all.”4 After the Second World War, the United Nations General 
Assembly created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represents 
“a proclamation of basic rights and fundamental freedoms, bearing the moral 
force of universal agreement.”5 In order to give legal force to the human rights 
guaranteed under the Universal Declaration, the General Assembly adopted the 
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
 
 1 For the purposes of this Note, “state” refers to a domestic state in the United States, 
while “State” refers to a nation-state. 
 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 3 Human Rights Comm., Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights: Factors that Impede Equal Political Participation and Steps to Overcome 
Those Challenges, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/29 (2014) [hereinafter Political Participation Re-
port]. 
 4 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1), Civil 
and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee 1 (2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 15]; 
see also U.N. Charter art. 1 para. 2. 
 5 Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 4. 
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in 1966.6 Both treaties set “basic [human rights] standards that have inspired 
more than 100 international and regional human rights conventions, declarations, 
sets of rules and principles.”7 Once the ICCPR had thirty-five State ratifications, 
it entered into force in 1976 (ten years after its adoption by the General Assem-
bly).8 At the time of this Note’s publication in July 2021, 173 countries were 
party to the ICCPR, and of those, 74 were signatories.9  
 
A. About the ICCPR  
 
The ICCPR is “the most comprehensive and well-established [United Nations] 
treaty on civil and political rights,” containing binding legal obligations for State 
parties.10 Despite its coexistence with various other human rights instruments, 
the ICCPR represents a basic universal human rights standard in international 
law.11 It is often used “to measure and assess the human rights performance of 
States and as the starting point for the development of new international human 
rights instruments.”12 The ICCPR’s civil liberty protections make it central to 
determining how the United States’ federal, state, and local governments can best 
ensure that U.S. elections comply with international law.  
 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 U.N. Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of 
Ratification, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
 9 Id. 
 10 SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ, AND MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 4 (2000); 
Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in OXFORD MONOGRAPHS IN INT’L LAW 
1.34 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1991). 
 11 Other international human rights instruments guaranteeing political rights include: Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights, Art. 21; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Art. 5(c); Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), Art. 7–9; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 23; African [Ban-
jul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 13; and the Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women. SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 147 (2003); see generally Office 
of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Core International Human Rights Instruments 
and Their Monitoring Bodies, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Feb. 
15, 2020). 
 12 McGoldrick supra note 10, at 1.38. 
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i. Human Rights Committee  
 
Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), 
a treaty-based body created by the State parties.13 The HRC is comprised of 
eighteen independent experts elected for four-year renewable terms.14 HRC 
members must be nationals of State parties and “persons of high moral character 
and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being 
given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experi-
ence.”15 
As the sole body with express functions related to the ICCPR, the HRC is in 
charge of monitoring compliance of member States with their obligations under 
the ICCPR.16 The HRC examines and responds to State reports and considers 
inter-State complaints and individual complaints17 with regard to alleged viola-
tions of the ICCPR.18 Additionally, the HRC works to clarify the scope and 
meaning of the ICCPR by developing “General Comments,” which are state-
ments of law expressing the HRC’s understanding of a particular provision in the 
ICCPR.19 These General Comments serve to make the ICCPR a living instru-








 13 McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 2.18. 
 14 U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WORKING WITH THE UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMME: A HANDBOOK FOR CIVIL SOCIETY, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/06/10/Rev.1 (2008). 
 15 ICCPR, supra note 2, arts. 28–29; see also Dana D. Fischer, Note and Comment, Re-
porting Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human 
Rights Committee, 76 A.J.I.L. 142, 142–43 (1982); Human Rights Comm., Introduction, U.N. 
HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last 
visited October 8, 2019). 
 16 McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 2.1; Human Rights Comm., supra note 15; see also 
ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 28. 
 17 The HRC can only consider individual complaints from citizens of States that have 
signed onto the first optional protocol. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
302, entered into force March 23, 1976. 
 18 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 41. 
 19 Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 4, at 24. 
 20 Id. 
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ii. Optional Protocols 
 
Two optional protocols supplement the ICCPR, and State parties may sign 
onto either or both.21 The first optional protocol, adopted in 1986, sets out a com-
plaint system through which the HRC receives and considers complaints from 
individuals alleging that their rights guaranteed under the treaty have been vio-
lated.22 The second optional protocol, adopted in 1991, prohibits the death pen-
alty.23 At the time of this Note’s publication in July 2021, of the 173 parties that 
have ratified the treaty, 116 are party to the First Optional Protocol and 88 are 
party to the second Optional Protocol.24 The United States has not ratified either 
protocol.25 
 
iii. State Reporting  
 
All parties to the ICCPR are required to submit reports to the HRC “on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the 
ICCPR] and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights . . . .”26 This 
responsibility to periodically submit reports to the HRC is the only obligation 
that State parties assume upon ratification of the ICCPR.27 The reporting process 
calls on States to indicate the factors impeding full implementation of the 
ICCPR.28 In regard to political rights, parties are asked to describe their country’s 
rules governing the right to vote, the application of those rules, factors which 
impede citizens from exercising their right to vote, and the positive measures 
 
 21 Id. at 3. 
 22 Id. at 10–11. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of 
Ratification, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 23, 2018); Second Optional Protocol to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of Ratification, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, 
entered into force July 11, 1991, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TRE 
ATY&mtdsg_no=IV12&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 25 Optional Protocol, supra note 24; Second Optional Protocol, supra note 24. 
 26 ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 40(1). 
 27 McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 62. 
 28 Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in 
Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights 
and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶ 13, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 
1996), https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc22.html (last visited Oct. 15 2019) [hereinaf-
ter General Comment No. 25]. 
448 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:441 
adopted to overcome these factors.29 Additionally, States are expected to indicate 
and explain legislative provisions that would deprive citizens of their vote, prov-
ing that any grounds for deprivation are both objective and reasonable.30  
The HRC’s process of reporting seeks to fulfill several goals. First, the report-
ing process provides an opportunity for State parties to develop an understanding 
of their obligations under the ICCPR, take stock of the current situation with 
regard to rights guaranteed under the ICCPR, and identify areas requiring reform 
to ensure the State’s compliance with the ICCPR.31 Second, “publicity surround-
ing the preparation of a report draws attention to the level of the State’s compli-
ance with its obligations and the ways individuals and groups can further con-
tribute to their implementation.”32 Through its review of State reports, the HRC 
seeks to encourage public debate on its findings.33 Finally, “reporting highlights 
good practices and lessons learned which may be drawn on by other States” as 
they implement the ICCPR.34  
Three types of State reports have emerged: (1) Initial Reports, submitted by 
parties in accordance with the basic obligation under Article 40(1)(a) of the 
ICCPR; (2) Supplementary Reports, containing additional inquiries, typically in 
response to inadequate or incomplete initial reports; and (3) Periodic Reports, 
which provide for continuous constructive dialogue between parties and the 
HRC.35 A State party must submit its first report one year after the ICCPR enters 
into force for the country.36 After the initial report, countries report whenever the 
HRC requests—usually between three to five years after the initial report.37 The 
HRC sets out when a country’s next report is due in its “Concluding Observa-
tions” of that State party’s most recent report.38 
In July 2018, the HRC adopted a simplified reporting procedure and decided 
to strive to limit the number of questions in each list of issues to twenty-five 
questions.39 The new procedure for State reporting, effective January 1, 2020, 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. ¶ 14. 
 31 Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 4, at 22. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 3.3-.5 
 36 Human Rights Comm., Consolidated Guidelines for State Reports Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ B.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 
(2001). 
 37 U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 14. 
 38 Id. 
 39 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm.: The Pre-
dictable Review Cycle, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/PredictableReviewCycle.aspx (last vis-
ited Oct. 19, 2020); Human Rights Comm., Decision on Additional Measures to Simplify the 
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aims to improve predictability in reporting and to ensure regular reporting by all 
State parties.40 This eight-year review cycle “aims to focus, coordinate[,] and 
streamline the reporting process and the dialogues, [and] facilitate[s] enhanced 
interaction between States parties and other stakeholders and the treaty bodies.”41 
Under the revised reporting procedures, the fifth U.S. Report is due to the HRC 
in 2021.42 Because this predictable review cycle did not exist during the 2018 
U.S. elections, this Note references State party reports submitted under the 
HRC’s pre-2020 State reporting procedures. 
 
iv. Examining State Reports 
 
The process of examining a State’s report spans two consecutive HRC ses-
sions.43 During the first session, the report is assigned to a Country Report Task 
Force,44 which drafts a “List of Issues” addressing the most crucial matters re-
lated to the enjoyment of rights guaranteed under the ICCPR within the member 
State.45 When seeking additional information from a State party, the HRC sends 
a List of Issues to the party at least one HRC session prior to the one at which 
the State’s report will be examined.46 The HRC encourages State parties to pro-
vide written answers to the List of Issues prior to the HRC’s public examination 
of the report.47 The HRC’s examination process begins with a private meeting of 
representatives from specialized agencies and other parts of the United Nations 
that wish to provide information on the State to be considered as well as a brief-
ing on views of members of civil society wishing to provide input.48 
The HRC then examines a State’s report “in a public constructive dialogue 
with a delegation of the relevant State party.”49 During this examination, HRC 
members may ask questions of the State’s representatives in order to deepen their 
understanding of the issues concerning the State’s implementation of the 
 
Reporting Procedure and Increase Predictability (2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/CCPR/Decision_on_2020.docx (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
 40 Human Rights Comm., supra note 39. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Fact Sheet No. 15, supra note 4, at 18. Every year, the HRC holds three plenary ses-
sions, which each last three weeks. Id. at 14. 
 44 Country Report Task Forces consist of four to six HRC members and were created in 
2002 to help streamline the State reporting procedure. Id at 18. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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ICCPR.50 After this discussion, the HRC drafts and publishes its “Concluding 
Observations,” which provide consensus comments on positive and negative as-
pects of a State party’s implementation of the ICCPR.51 These Concluding Ob-
servations are a useful way of monitoring a country’s human rights record, help-
ing States prepare their future reports and enabling the HRC to focus on 
important issues in a State’s future reports.52 
In 2001, the HRC established the “Special Rapporteur on Follow-up to Con-
cluding Observations” to collect and assess follow-up information requested 
from parties in the HRC’s Concluding Observations.53 The HRC typically re-
quests information regarding measures that the State has taken to address partic-
ular areas causing the HRC concern.54 The Special Rapporteur makes a recom-
mendation to the HRC on any further steps that may be appropriate, and the HRC 
meets to discuss next steps.55  
 
B. Political Rights Under Article 25 
 
Article 25 of the ICCPR guarantees political rights to all citizens of State par-
ties.56 The provision is based on Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and represents a means by which the rights guaranteed under the 
Universal Declaration may be legally binding.57 The rights guaranteed under Ar-
ticle 25 include the right to be involved in the conduct of public affairs; the right 
to vote and be elected to public office; and the right to seek public service posi-
tions on an equal basis.58  
 
i. State Obligations Under Article 25 
 
Protecting political rights under the ICCPR not only requires that States refrain 
from certain acts but also places a duty on State parties to take certain positive 
 
 50 Id. at 19. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 19–20. 
 53 Id. at 20. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 147 (2003). 
 57 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 438 ¶ 5 (1st ed. 1993); see also G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 58 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 147. 
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measures to protect citizens’ rights.59 A State party’s primary responsibilities in-
clude ensuring that elections are held, that all citizens are able to exercise their 
right of equal suffrage, and that citizens are guaranteed a vote by secret ballot.60 
If any emergency threatens one of a State’s institutions (i.e., the “life of the na-
tion”), the country is authorized to derogate these institutions under the ICCPR; 
however, the HRC has refused to permit derogation of the rights provided for in 
Article 25.61 This suggests the importance of the political rights guaranteed by 
the ICCPR and demonstrates the HRC’s desire for State parties to implement the 
rights guaranteed under Article 25 into domestic law. Analyzing whether Geor-
gia’s election procedures caused the United States to violate international law 
under the ICCPR requires an examination of the ICCPR’s Article 25(a), govern-
ing the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, and Article 25(b), guar-
anteeing the right to vote and be elected.62  
Guaranteeing the right to vote under the ICCPR requires, for instance, “that 
the State refrain from manipulatively influencing voters or that it respect the se-
crecy of the ballot.”63 State parties must also take positive steps to guarantee that 
all eligible persons have the actual opportunity to exercise their political rights.64 
It is not enough for States to extend formal voting eligibility to all citizens when 
the State does not simultaneously ensure that those citizens are truly able to make 
use of their right to vote.65 Additionally, the HRC has advised States that voter 
education and voter registration campaigns may be necessary to ensure the ef-
fective exercise of Article 25 rights by an informed community.66 In States where 
voter registration is required, the HRC established that registration “should be 
facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed.”67  
 
 59 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 436 ¶ 1; General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 12; 
CARLSON, supra note 11, at 151. 
 60 NOWAK, supra note 57. 
 61 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4 (failing to prohibit derogation of Article 25); Human Rights 
Comm., Silva et al. v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 34/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) 
(demonstrating the HRC’s inability to foresee justification for derogation of Article 25); see 
also U.N. Experts Urge Turkey to Adhere to Its Human Rights Obligations Even in Time of 
Declared Emergency, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R NEWS, (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News 
ID=20394 (arguing HRC will not authorize derogation of Article 25). Thus far in the history 
of the ICCPR, two Member States have attempted to derogate Article 25, and in both instances, 
the HRC did not give any indication that justification is even possible for the derogation of 
Article 25. Id. 
 62 See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25(a-b) (guaranteeing these rights “without unreasonable 
restrictions”). 
 63 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 436 ¶ 1. 
 64 Id. at 439 ¶ 9. 
 65 Id. 
 66 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 151. 
 67 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 11. 
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The ICCPR does not require any particular electoral system, but it requires 
that the system each State party has is compatible with the rights protected by 
Article 25 and guarantees and gives effect to the free expression of the will of 
the electors.68 The HRC has advised States that any abusive interference with 
registration or voting, as well as intimidation or coercion of voters, should be 
prohibited by penal laws to be strictly enforced.69  
 
ii. ICCPR Article 25(a) 
 
Article 25(a) of the ICCPR requires that every citizen “have the right and the 
opportunity, . . . without unreasonable restrictions . . . [t]o take part in the con-
duct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”70 The 
provision establishes, “[T]he exercise of State authority must be based on the 
principle of sovereignty of the people, i.e., the government is ultimately respon-
sible to the people and may also be controlled and deposed by it.”71  
Although the ICCPR does not call for a specific democratic model, State po-
litical systems based on absolute monarchical legitimacy, a “Führerprinzip,” or 
a similar autocratic structure, have been found to violate the basic right to polit-
ical participation guaranteed under Article 25(a).72 A parliamentary democracy 
based on separation of powers does not violate Article 25(a) where the judicial 
and executive authorities are autocratically appointed or even where the head of 
State is determined by monarchic succession, as in northern Europe.73 “In dem-
ocratic models not based on separation of powers, . . . citizens [must] be able to 
exercise influence, at least indirectly, on the conduct of public affairs by way of 
the election of councils and similar [bodies] exercising State power.”74  
Article 25(a) is intended to protect not only indirect participation through 
elected individuals but also forms of direct or plebiscitary democracy.75 How-
ever, the obligation under Article 25(b) of States to hold periodic elections makes 
clear that “representative democracy may not be completely supplanted by 
 
 68 Id. ¶ 21; JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 503 ¶ 21. 
 69 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 11. 
 70 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25(a). 
 71 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 441 ¶ 11. 
 72 Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
 73 See id. ¶ 12 (“However, should the head of State exercise public affairs largely autono-
mously and independent of the legislative authority, it seems necessary that he (she) be elected 
either directly or indirectly by the people, which is usually the case in most presidential repub-
lics, following the model of the United States.”). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 441–42 ¶ 13. 
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plebiscitary forms of participation.”76 The reference to direct participation in Ar-
ticle 25(a) gives citizens a subjective right to take part in forms of plebiscitary 
political participation when they are provided for by the respective State party.77 
Participation through freely chosen representatives is exercised through voting 
processes that must comply with Article 25(b).78 
 
iii. ICCPR Article 25(b) 
 
Article 25(b) of the ICCPR is the specific application of the general rule ex-
pressed in Article 25(a).79 The provision requires that every citizen “have the 
right and opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions . . . [t]o vote and to 
be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors.”80 The State bears the burden of proving “that any re-
strictions on Article 25 rights are objective and reasonable.”81 Additionally, the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has ex-
plained that limitations on the right to vote “must be prescribed by law and must 
be necessary in the interests of certain public goals, such as national security, 
public order, health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”82 Therefore, State parties must take all necessary steps to implement 
the right to vote without restrictions, unless those restrictions are objective, rea-
sonable, and necessary. 
The selection of voting principles that would guarantee the right to vote and 
be elected under the ICCPR was originally highly controversial.83 While the “So-
viet Union placed emphasis on the principles of universal, equal, and direct suf-
frage, the Western States stressed the right of free and genuine elections.”84 Dur-
ing the drafting of Article 25, only the right of secret ballot was generally 
 
 76 See id. at 442 ¶ 13 (explaining that it may be inferred from the word “or” in Article 25 
that State Parties are not obligated to create possibilities for plebiscitary participation). 
 77 Id. at 444 ¶ 17. 
 78 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 149. 
 79 MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 474 (1987). 
 80 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25. 
 81 DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT’L & THE CARTER CTR., Strengthening International Law 
to Support Democratic Governance and Genuine Elections, § 4.5.2 at 30 (2012). 
 82 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights 
Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, at 47, HR/PUB/06/12 (2002). 
 83 NOWAK, supra note 57 ¶ 18, at 444. 
 84 Id. 
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recognized among State parties.85 Ultimately, however, the drafters accepted that 
universal and equal suffrage, along with the secret ballot, results in a democracy 
in which each vote counts equally.86  
In guaranteeing the right to vote under Article 25(b) of the ICCPR, States have 
the responsibility to ensure that elections are “periodic” and “genuine.”87 Peri-
odic means that elections must be held at regular intervals, the determination of 
which lies with State parties.88 Scholars have assumed that the customary span 
of four to six years may not be exceeded too far.89 Though this gives states some 
flexibility, the administration of elections should be systematic and predictable 
in accordance with rule of law; therefore, arbitrary postponement of scheduled 
elections violates Article 25.90  
Genuine elections require that voters have a certain minimum amount of po-
litical influence and that eligible voters may freely choose among various alter-
natives—parties, programs, or at least several candidates of the uniform party.91 
The ICCPR’s travaux préparatoires, which explain the drafting of the ICCPR, 
demonstrate that one-party systems are permissible so long as there are no un-
reasonable restrictions on the principles of genuine, free elections.92 A one-party 
system may be justified in a country if “the structures within the party are plu-
ralistic and when the party represents a broad spectrum of the population.”93 
 
C. Restrictions on the Right to Vote  
 
Under the ICCPR, the right to vote must be established by law, but the right 
to vote is not an absolute right.94 The HRC has established that limitations on the 
right to vote may be acceptable so long as no distinction is made between citizens 
 
 85 Id. The concept of the secret ballot is considered the “best guarantee for free elections, 
mainly protecting minorities against the majority.” CARLSON, supra note 11, at 151. 
 86 NOWAK, supra note 57 ¶ 18, at 444; see also Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political 
Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539, 555–56 (1992) (providing an 
overview of Article 25’s development and application). 
 87 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25. 
 88 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 150. 
 89 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 436 ¶ 1. 
 90 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 150. 
 91 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 436 ¶ 1. 
 92 Id. at 443–44; see generally BOSSUYT, supra note 79 (discussing the drafting of the 
ICCPR). 
 93 NOWAK, supra note 57, at 444. 
 94 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 10; Alex Conte, Democratic and Civil 
Rights, in ALEX CONTE & RICHARD BURCHILL, DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ch. 4, p. 100 (Routledge 
2nd ed. 2016), http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login.aspx?di-
rect=true&db=e000xna&AN=271888&site=eds-live (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
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on the grounds mentioned in Article 2(1)95 and no unreasonable restrictions are 
imposed.96 The HRC has emphasized that restrictions should remain the excep-
tion rather that the rule and that limitations should never impair the essence of 
the right to vote.97 Illegitimate restrictions on the right to vote are a barrier to the 
equal exercise of political rights.98 The text of the ICCPR does not provide sub-
stantive guidance on what may constitute a reasonable restriction on the right to 
vote; however, through its General Comment on Article 25 and its published 
evaluations of State reports, the HRC has further defined the meaning of reason-
able and unreasonable restrictions under Article 25.99  
The HRC has recognized that the principle of “one person, one vote” must 
apply, meaning the vote of one elector should be equal to the vote of another.100 
The HRC has also established that genuine elections require eligible individuals 
to have the opportunity to vote without undue influence or coercion of any kind 
which may distort or inhibit the free expression of the elector’s will.101  
The HRC has established that “[t]here should be independent scrutiny of the 
voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent 
process so that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot and the 
counting of the votes.”102 The HRC has not directly addressed vote counting be-
yond this observation. The only relevant decision from the HRC concerns the 
fairness of automated vote counting and was found to be inadmissible (although 
the decision did state that the ICCPR did not proscribe or prescribe any specific 
voting system).103  
 
i. Reasonable Restrictions 
 
The HRC’s General Comment on Article 25 explains that setting a minimum 
age limit for the right to vote is a reasonable restriction.104 Additionally, States 
 
 95 Without distinction such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. See ICCPR, supra note 2, at art. 
2(1). 
 96 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ ¶ 4, 10, 11, 14. 
 97 Political Participation Report, supra note 3 ¶ 31. 
 98 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 10. 
 99 Id. ¶ 4. 
 100 JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 503 ¶ 21. 
 101 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 19; CARLSON, supra note 11, at 150 (“Voters 
should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compul-
sion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind.”). 
 102 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 19. 
 103 See Human Rights Comm., Clippele v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1082/2002, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/77/D/1082/2002 (2003); see also Conte, supra note 94, at 103. 
 104 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 4. 
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may require a higher minimum age for election to particular offices than for ex-
ercising the right to vote, which should be available to every adult citizen.105 
Mental incapacity may also be a reasonable ground for denying an individual the 
right to vote.106  
States may deny the right to vote to persons convicted of serious crimes so 
long as the length of deprivation is proportionate to the offense.107 The HRC 
established that laws that strip convicts of their voting rights for up to ten years 
“may be a disproportionate restriction of the rights protected by [A]rticle 25.”108 
If a criminal conviction is the basis for suspending an individual’s right to vote, 
“the period of such suspension should be proportionate to the offence and the 
sentence.”109 Finally, the HRC has established that “persons who are deprived of 
liberty but who have not been convicted should not be excluded from exercising 
the right to vote.”110 
 
ii. Unreasonable Restrictions 
 
Although Article 25 limits the right to vote to citizens of State parties, the HRC 
has recognized that no distinction may be made among those citizens based on 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, or other status.111 In Debreczeny v. Netherlands, the HRC 
noted that “the right provided for by [A]rticle 25 is not an absolute right and that 
restrictions of this right are allowed as long as they are not discriminatory or 
unreasonable.”112 A State party may deprive citizens of their right to vote under 
Article 25(b) when the country has “objective and reasonable criteria regulated 
by law.”113 The HRC defines unreasonable restrictions on an individual’s right 
to vote to be those that lack a basis in objective and reasonable grounds.114  
 
 105 JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 502 ¶ 4. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Human Rights Comm., Comments on United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland (Hong Kong), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.57 (1995), ¶ 19 (addressing voting re-
strictions in laws in Hong Kong). 
 109 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 14. 
 110 Id. 
 111 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 148 (discussing the potential for violations of Article 25 
when distinctions are drawn between those entitled to citizenship by birth and those who ac-
quire it by naturalization). 
 112 Human Rights Comm’n., Debreczeny v. Netherlands, Commc’n No. 500/1992, ¶ 9.2, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992 (Apr. 4, 1995). 
 113 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 151. 
 114 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 4. 
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The most severe restriction on the right to free elections is the establishment 
of a one-party system.115 The HRC found a violation of Article 25 where the 
electoral system failed to provide for an equal distribution of voters among dis-
tricts due to the ICCPR’s requirement that each vote in an electoral system carry 
equal weight.116 The HRC has established that restrictions on voting for students 
enrolled in military schools are not reasonable.117  
The HRC has determined it unreasonable for States to restrict the right to vote 
based on a physical disability or to impose literacy, educational, or property re-
quirements.118 Additionally, party membership should not affect an individual’s 
eligibility to vote, which means that requiring an elector to be a member of a 
specific political party would present an unreasonable restriction.119 Moreover, 
the HRC has previously ruled that a person may not lose their right to vote based 
on personal political opinions.120 The HRC analyzed Uruguay’s law restricting 
political rights of “all candidates for election office, appearing in the 1966 and 
1971 election lists of Marxist or pro-Marxist parties or political groups declared 
illegal by Executive Power resolutions . . . .”121 Because these eligible voters 
were deprived political rights for fifteen years based on party membership, the 
HRC concluded that they had suffered from the country’s violation of Article 
25.122 In its communications with Uruguay, the HRC established that deprivation 
of an individual’s right to vote for a period of fifteen years is too long without 
specific justification of such a harsh measure.123  
In 2014, the HRC released a report on factors that impede equal participation 
and steps to overcome those challenges, hoping to encourage State parties to 
comply with the ICCPR’s protection of political rights.124 The report explains 
that recent human rights mechanisms have concluded that “wide-reaching re-
strictions or deprivations of electoral rights may not be compatible with guaran-
tees of equality and non-discrimination under international law.”125 In its report, 
 
 115 Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 1, 49 
(1995). 
 116 CARLSON, supra note 11, at 151; see also Human Rights Comm., Istvan Mátyus v. Slo-
vakia, Commc’n No. 923/2000, U.N. Doc. A/57/40, Vol. II, at 257 (2002). 
 117 Human Rights Comm., Concluding Comments on Paraguay, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/79/Add.48 (1995). 
 118 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 10. 
 119 Id.; Fox, supra note 115. 
 120 Human Rights Comm., Silva et al. v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 34/1978, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984). 
 121 Human Rights Comm., Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 44/1979, ¶ 2.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/12/D/44/1979 (1981). 
 122 Id. ¶ 17. 
 123 Id. ¶ 16. 
 124 Political Participation Report, supra note 3. 
 125 Id.; see also Human Rights Comm., Pietraroia v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 44/1979, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/44/1979 (1981); Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
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the HRC stated, “[a]dministrative restrictions, such as proof of residence or iden-
tity documentation requirements that might directly or indirectly prevent certain 
groups of citizens from exercising voting rights, should be removed.”126 Any 
residency requirements applicable to voter registration “must be reasonable, and 
[the requirements] should not be imposed in such a way as to exclude the home-
less from the right to vote.”127  
In 2015, the HRC released another report on the promotion, protection, and 
implementation of the right to participate in public affairs. In this report, the HRC 
explained its concern about the shrinking democratic space and the decline in 
voter turnout at elections in established democracies.128 The HRC expressed con-
cern that “[e]lection results do not always correspond to the wishes of the elec-
torate and [that] political parties around the world have struggled to effectively 
address economic and other issues of primary interest . . . .”129 Since the release 
of these reports, the United Nations has not provided additional guidance on how 
States should best ensure compliance with the provisions of Article 25 of the 
ICCPR. 
 
D. The United States and the ICCPR 
 
The United States signed the ICCPR in 1977 but waited to ratify it until 
1992.130 Due to its ratification, the ICCPR constitutes “the supreme Law of the 
Land” under the U.S. Constitution.131 Because the ICCPR limits international 
enforcement to a supervisory function, the primary responsibility for implement-
ing the ICCPR falls upon State parties.132 State parties have broad discretion in 
implementing the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR.133 The provisions of the 
 
General Comment No. 1 (2014); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Hu-
man Rights Committee: United States of America, Commc’n No. 1410/2005; U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 and Rev.1 (2006); NOWAK, supra note 57 at 576. 
 126 Political Participation Report, supra note 3. 
 127 General Comment No. 25, supra note 28 ¶ 11; see also Human Rights Comm., Con-
cluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (2014). 
 128 Human Rights Comm., Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights: Promotion Protection, and Implementation of the Right to Participate in 
Public Affairs in the Context of the Existing Human Rights Law: Best Practices, Experiences, 
Challenges, and Ways to Overcome Them 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/26 (2015). 
 129 Id. 
 130 U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights and Elections Stand-
ards Plan of Action (Dec. 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/HRElections.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
 131 U.S. Const. art. VI. 
 132 NOWAK, supra note 57, at ¶ 15. 
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ICCPR apply to all parts of federal States and to a State Party’s dependent terri-
tories with no exceptions.134 In the United States, federal, state, and local author-
ities share responsibility for implementing appropriate measures to ensure that 
the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR are protected.135  
When the U.S. Senate granted consent to ratify the ICCPR, it did not consent 
to either of the Optional Protocols.136 Further, the United States attached several 
reservations and understandings to its ratification, two of which are key to deter-
mining the obligations of the United States under the ICCPR: (1) “That the 
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [ICCPR] 
are not self-executing” and (2) “That the United States understands that this 
[ICCPR] shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it 
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, 
and otherwise by the state and local governments.”137 These provisions, along 
with the United States’ refusal to consent to the First Optional Protocol (as an 
avenue for individual complaints to the HRC), make it difficult for the HRC to 
ensure that the United States is protecting its citizens’ human rights as provided 
in the ICCPR. 
 
i. Pre-2018 United States Reports 
 
The United States previously submitted reports to the HRC in 1994, 2005, 
2011, and 2014.138 The U.S. Department of State is responsible for drafting the 
country’s reports, coordinating U.S. government responses, and ensuring the 
country appears before the HRC.139 In communicating with the HRC, the United 
 
 134 Id.; see also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 50; Human Rights Comm., General Comment 
No. 31 [80], Nature of the General Legal Obligations on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 7, 
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and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); see also Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33, available at http://un-
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States has expressed its commitment to the promotion and protection of human 
rights, promising to “work closely together with member States to advance hu-
man rights and to remain in an open dialogue with the special procedures man-
date-holders.” However, the United States has frequently failed to submit timely 
reports or responses to HRC requests for information.140 
On October 10, 2013, four days before the start of the session in which the 
HRC would review the fourth U.S. Report, the United States requested that the 
review of its report be postponed due to the Government Shutdown. The HRC 
postponed its review of the U.S. Report until March 26, 2014.141 The HRC’s 
Concluding Observations following its review of the U.S. Report detailed posi-
tive actions taken by the State party to recognize the protected human rights, 
noting “with appreciation the many efforts undertaken by the State party and the 
progress made in protecting civil and political rights.”142 However, when an-
nouncing the HRC’s Concluding Observations on the U.S. Report during a press 
conference, the chairman of the HRC spoke out about the country’s failure to 
effectuate the ICCPR stating, “[t]here was no suggestion that any of those re-
sponsible for any of the past criminal violations of [the ICCPR] would be brought 
to justice or that its victims would have access to their day in court.”143 
The HRC’s response, detailing its principal matters of concern144 regarding 
the fourth U.S. Report, included a section on voting rights reiterating the HRC’s 
“concern about the persistence of state-level felon disenfranchisement laws, their 
 
 140 See generally Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
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system, racial profiling, the death penalty, targeted killings using unmanned aerial vehicles 
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[sic] disproportionate impact on minorities[,] and the lengthy and cumbersome 
voting restoration procedures in states.”145 The HRC also expressed its concern 
“that voter identification and other recently introduced eligibility requirements 
may impose excessive burdens on voters and result in de facto disenfranchise-
ment of large numbers of voters.”146 The HRC recommended that the United 
States “remove or streamline lengthy and cumbersome voting restoration proce-
dures . . . [and] take all necessary measures to ensure that voter identification 
requirements and the new eligibility requirements do not impose excessive bur-
dens on voters and result in de facto disenfranchisement.”147  
Following the U.S. Report submission and review in 2014, the United States 
submitted follow-up reports responding to the HRC’s concerns in April 2015, 
October 2015, and October 2017.148 These communications focused on the 
HRC’s four recommendations from its 2014 Concluding Observations—ac-
countability for past human rights violations, gun violence, detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay, and National Security Agency surveillance—but did not address 
issues related to political participation.149 
 
ii. Post-2018 United States Reports 
 
In anticipation of the Unites States’ fifth periodic report, the HRC provided 
the country with a List of Issues on April 2, 2019.150 The HRC set forth its con-
cerns related to the right to political participation in the United States in this 
document, requesting updated information on the measures adopted by the 
United States to guarantee political rights since the HRC’s most recent Conclud-
ing Recommendations in 2014.151 The HRC requested that the United States 
“provide updated information on measures adopted by the State party to encour-
age . . . the removal of lengthy and cumbersome voting restoration procedures” 
and asked that the country “comment on the prevalence of voter suppression 
measures . . . such as cuts to early voting and voter identification laws, which 
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may impose an excessive burden on voters, especially those belonging to minor-
ity groups.”152 Finally, the HRC requested “information on the measures taken 
to prevent undue influence on the conduct of elections at the federal and state 
levels.”153 
The United States responded to these concerns on January 15, 2021 in its fifth 
report to the HRC.154 The fifth U.S. Report detailed recent decisions from the 
U.S. Supreme Court concerning election and voting laws and focused on the fact 
that U.S. citizens have the opportunity to challenge these laws in U.S. courts.155  
Implicitly, the United States argues that it has not violated international law un-
der Article 25 of the ICCPR because the country’s courts have determined that 
the relevant election and voting laws do not violate domestic law under the U.S. 
Constitution, the Federal Voting Rights Act, state constitutions, or state statutory 
law.  
 
III. GEORGIA’S 2018 ELECTION PROCEDURES 
 
The 2018 U.S. midterm elections saw record levels of voter turnout, women 
and minorities elected to Congress, and complaints of voter suppression.156 Alt-
hough 118.5 million Americans across the country cast a ballot in 2018 (turnout 
being more than ten percent higher than it was during the 2014 midterm elec-
tions), nearly 120 million eligible Americans did not vote.157 No state attracted 
more attention during the leadup to the elections than Georgia, where several 
lawsuits were filed alleging issues with the state’s election and voting systems.158 
Many of the complaints centered around concerns of voter registrations being 
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put on hold, discriminatory voter purges, precinct consolidations, and long lines 
on election day.159  
In Georgia’s gubernatorial race, Brian Kemp was simultaneously the Repub-
lican candidate and the acting Secretary of State, meaning he was in charge of 
administering the election in which he was running.160 His opponent, Democrat 
Stacey Abrams—Georgia’s former state House Minority Leader—was vying to 
be the first African-American governor of Georgia and the first female governor 
in U.S. history.161 In the weeks leading up to the election, Abrams and several 
voting rights advocacy groups claimed that Kemp was using his office to sup-
press votes and tilt the election in his favor, while Kemp denied those allega-
tions.162 An American Public Media Reports (“APM”) review of U.S. court rec-
ords found that “more federal voting rights lawsuits have been filed against 
officials in Georgia than any other state except Texas since 2011.”163 APM also 
found that Georgia is the only state once under federal oversight164 to have 
adopted all five of the most common voter suppression tactics studied in 2018 
by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: voter ID laws, proof of citizenship re-
quirements, purges, cuts in early voting, and polling places closures. This Note 
looks at two of these potential tactics—purges and polling place closures—as 
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jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination—mostly southern states—could not 
change voting practices or procedures without “preclearance,” a determination by the U.S. 
Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determining that the 
change did not have a discriminatory purpose and would not have a discriminatory effect. In 
April 2010, Shelby County, Alabama (a largely white suburb of Birmingham) filed suit in 
federal court asking that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act be declared unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court held that the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was 
unconstitutional; while the Court’s decision did not strike down Section 5, it has little signifi-
cance without Section 4’s coverage formula. See United States Dep’t of Justice, History of 
Federal Voting Rights Laws, https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws 
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well as the long lines at several Georgia polling places during the 2018 election 
to determine whether Georgia’s procedures constitute a violation of international 
law under Article 25 of the ICCPR.  
 
A. Problems with Voter Registration 
 
Several voting-related complaints in Georgia centered around the state’s pro-
cess of maintaining its voter registration list.165 Lawsuits challenged Kemp’s 
methods of removing voters from the rolls, either because the voter did not vote 
in recent elections or because the information on the voter’s registration form did 
not completely match information in the state’s database.166 The purpose of this 
purging process is to “ensure that the voter rolls are accurate and up-to-date, but 
when done incorrectly, it can “disenfranchise legitimate voters (often when it is 
too close to an election to rectify the mistake), causing confusion and delay at 
the polls.”167 Good reasons for removing a voter from the list include the voter’s 
moving out-of-state or death.168 However, problems arise when states remove 
eligible voters by relying on faulty data.169 Often, these eligible voters do not 
realize they have been removed from the list until attempting to vote on Election 
Day. Further, if the voter lives in a state without election day registration, such 
as Georgia, he or she is often prevented from participating in the election.170  
Few states have increased the number of voter purges more than Georgia.171 
In November 2018, Georgia had around seven million registered voters.172 Mil-
lions of eligible Georgia voters have been purged from the registration list since 
2010, when Kemp began his tenure as Secretary of State.173 According to a report 
by the Brennan Center for Justice, “Georgia purged twice as many voters—1.5 
million—between the 2012 and 2016 elections as it did between 2008 and 
 
 165 Jonathan Brater et al., Purges: A Growing Threat to the Right to Vote, BRENNAN CTR. 
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 166 Tony Pugh, Georgia Secretary of State Fighting Accusations of Disenfranchising Mi-
nority Voters, IMPACT2020 (Oct. 7, 2016, 1:14PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/pol-
itics-government/article106692837.html; see also Brater et al., supra note 165. 
 167 Brater et al., supra note 165. 
 168 Kevin Morris, Voter Purge Rates Remain High, Analysis Finds, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/voter-
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2012.”174 Between 2010 and 2014, the median purge rate in Georgia increased 
from 6.7 percent to 10.7 percent.175 APM recently reported that Georgia is one 
of at least nine U.S. states that has purged hundreds of thousands of people from 
the rolls since the 2014 general election.176 Data demonstrates that leading up to 
the election in 2018, Georgia continued this trend, purging 10.6 percent of its 
total electorate between 2016 and 2018.177  
 
i. “Exact Match” 
 
Pursuant to the U.S. Help America Vote Act of 2002, each state is required to 
implement a centralized, computerized statewide voter registration list contain-
ing the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the 
state.178 In Georgia, this system is called “eNet.”179 Under Georgia’s 2018 “exact 
match” law,180 when a person submits a voter registration application in Georgia, 
county election officials use eNet to compare the application information to in-
formation on file with the Georgia Department of Driver Services (“DDS”)181 or 
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).182 If the information on the voter’s 
application does not exactly match the applicant’s data on file with DDS or SSA, 
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Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1255-56 (N.D. Ga. 2018). 
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https://gvrs.sos.state.ga.us/ElectioNet/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). 
 180 See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-220.1 (2018). 
 181 When matching registration data against the DDS database, the automated system com-
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number, and citizenship status. Complaint at ¶ 37, Ga. State Conference of the NAACP et al. 
v. Kemp, No. 1:17-cv-01427-TCB (N.D. Ga. 2017), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-13-GA-NAACP-Kemp-Complaint-FINAL.pdf. 
 182 Ga. Coal. for the People’s Agenda, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 1255–56. When matching regis-
tration data against the DDS database, eNet compares the following fields: first name, last 
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the application is flagged and placed in “pending” status.183  The person may not 
vote until he or she corrects the information.184 When an application is flagged, 
county registrars mail a letter to the flagged applicants, notifying the individuals 
of their pending status and ways to remedy the issue.185 The burden is on the 
applicant to correct the information or present the necessary proof required to 
become a Georgia voter within twenty-six months; if the applicant is unable to 
do so, his or her application is rejected, and the individual must start over with a 
new voter registration application.186  
In years prior to the 2018 controversy over the exact match rule in Georgia, 
Kemp’s office used an older version of the same protocol, which automatically 
cancelled registrations of those who failed to correct their information within 
forty days.187 In 2016, a coalition of civil rights groups filed a lawsuit in federal 
court seeking to halt enforcement of the exact match rule, arguing that the pro-
cess disproportionately affected voters of color in the state.188 The case was set-
tled in 2017 after Kemp’s office agreed to a number of reforms that removed the 
deadline period and allowed those flagged in the system to vote if they provided 
identification at the polls.189 However, during the 2018 legislative session, Geor-
gia passed a new version of the exact match protocol, Georgia State House Bill 
268 (“HB 268”), which reinstated a deadline for correcting registrations within 
twenty-six months.190  
 
 183 An individual’s application may be flagged for several reasons, but a person is most 
often placed in pending status due to citizenship status or other non-matching information, 
such as a misspelled name. See Ga. Coal. for the People’s Agenda, 347 F. Supp. at 1256–57 
(discussing potential reasons for flagged applications); Nadler, supra note 160 (“An applica-
tion could be held because of an entry error or a dropped hyphen in a last name, for example.”); 
H.B. 549, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (enacted) (amending O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
231 to require removal of registration of every person that declined jury duty based on noncit-
izenship). 
 184 H.B. 549, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (enacted). 
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dex.php/general/information_for_pending_voters (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). These notifica-
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REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-election-registrations/georgia-
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To stop enforcement of HB 268 prior to the 2018 elections, several civil rights 
groups sued Kemp, alleging that the voter registration verification process im-
posed severe burdens on voting-eligible Georgians’ fundamental right to vote.191 
According to the lawsuit, discrepancies that placed eligible voters in “pending” 
status were often due to human data-entry errors, including typos, misreading of 
imperfect handwriting, and misspellings associated with maiden names, hyphen-
ated names or initials.192 The complaint states that the exact match policy relies 
on county election officials to correctly input voter registration data into the 
match system.193 Mismatches between databases can result from innocuous mis-
takes and frequently result from no fault of the voter whatsoever.194  
 
ii. “Use It or Lose It” 
 
Georgia enacted its “use it or lose it” statute, which provides for the removal 
of citizens from voter registration rolls, in 1994.195 The U.S. Department of Jus-
tice initially objected to the law, warning Georgia officials that the law was “di-
rectly contrary to the language and purpose of [U.S. law] and is likely to have a 
disproportionate adverse effect on minority voters in the state.”196 Despite this 
warning, Georgia’s legislature enacted the statute, and it remains in effect to-
day.197 Georgia does not maintain any clear data on how many people have been 
purged under the use it or lose it policy, which makes it difficult to determine the 
effect these removals have had on the state’s election outcomes.198  
In Georgia, the removal process is triggered if an individual does not vote, 
respond to a mailed notice, or make contact with election officials over a three-
 
 191 An analysis of records obtained by the Associated Press also revealed racial disparity 
in the process: Georgia’s population is approximately 32 percent black, according to the U.S. 
Census, but the list of voter registrations on hold with Kemp’s office is nearly 70 percent 
black. See Nadler, supra note 160. 
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 195 Ga. H.R. Bill 12017 Reg. Sess., 1994 Ga. Laws 1443 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
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voter registration list for not voting in past elections. See Johnny Kauffman, 6 Takeaways from 
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https://www.npr.org/2018/10/22/659591998/6-takeaways-from-georgias-use-it-or-lose-it-
voter-purge-investigation. 
 196 Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division, Letter to Dennis R. 
Dunn, (Oct. 24, 1994), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/GA-
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year span.199 Once the process is triggered, if the individual does not vote or 
make contact with election officials over two more federal election cycles, he or 
she will be purged from the voter rolls.200 The use it or lose it purging process 
takes seven years in Georgia.201 Under this procedure, U.S. citizens in good 
standing who have not moved, committed a crime, or otherwise jeopardized their 
right to vote can trigger the removal process by not showing up to vote.202  
In a single day in July 2017, more than half a million people—eight percent 
of Georgia’s registered voters—were removed from Georgia’s voter rolls, pri-
marily based on their failure to vote in the previous election.203 Many of these 
previously registered voters did not realize they had been dropped from the rolls 
until showing up to vote in the 2018 election.204 Kemp oversaw this purge as 
Georgia’s Secretary of State just eight months after he announced his candidacy 
for governor.205 Although Georgia maintains no clear data on how many people 
have been removed from the list based on the state’s use it or lose it statute, an 
APM investigation found that it was the reason for removing eighteen percent of 
all individuals removed from the list during the July 2017 purge; under the stat-
ute, Georgia purged around 107,000 voters.206 Georgia voters who went to the 
polls in 2008—when President Barack Obama ran the first time and turnout was 
high—but have not voted since then were likely removed from the state’s voter 
registration list in 2017.207  
In the United States, using a person’s decision not to vote as the trigger to 
remove them from the rolls is a highly controversial, yet legal, practice.208 Ad-
vocates of updating registration rolls justify purges by explaining that the state’s 
interest in prohibiting voter fraud outweighs the burden placed on voters; how-
ever, others see it as burdening an individual’s ability to exercise his or her right 
to vote. Voting rights advocates argue that one problem with the use it or lose it 
policy is that infrequent voting does not necessarily prove that a person is ineli-
gible to vote.209  
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id.; see also Kauffman, supra note 195 (discussing takeaways from an investigation of 
Georgia’s “use it or lose it” voter purge). 
 207 CAPUTO ET AL., supra note 163. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
2021] PURGES AND CLOSURES AND LINES, OH MY! 469 
Kemp refers to this process as “voter list maintenance,” defending his office’s 
use of it as an effective way of protecting the state’s elections from voter fraud.210  
He has responded to complaints about the practice by stating,  
So you think we should just leave people alone in perpetuity? I 
mean, what happens if they move to another state? People all the 
time move to another state, and they don’t tell us and end up get-
ting on the voter rolls in two different states. We’ve had the same 
person voting twice in two different states in presidential elec-
tions. So there’s a reason you keep the voter rolls current and up 
to date . . . . We don’t have near the problems other states have 
with voter fraud, I believe, but we do have it.211  
In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state of Ohio’s voter purge statute 
as constitutionally valid under federal law.212 Ohio’s statute is similar to Geor-
gia’s, except registered voters in Ohio become ineligible after two years instead 
of three.213 Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito explained that “use it 
or lose it” statutes may or may not be good policy but do not violate federal 
law.214 In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Kemp stated, “[t]his ruling 
affirms that commonsense measures like Georgia’s voter list maintenance stat-
utes, which prevent fraud at the ballot box, are appropriate and necessary to en-
sure secure, accessible[,] and fair elections.”215 Despite this U.S. Supreme Court 
decision permitting the practice of removing eligible voters from the rolls under 
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domestic law, the United States may still be violating international law under 
Article 25 of the ICCPR based on its states’ use it or lose it statutes. 
 
B. Problems with Voter Access 
 
In Georgia, complaints of voter registration issues prior to election day were 
followed by complaints of voting access issues on election day. Many registered, 
eligible Georgia voters faced difficulty voting in the 2018 election due to state 
policies and decisions resulting in fewer precincts, a lack of voting machines, 
and issues with voting machines. 
 
i. Precinct Consolidation  
 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,216 
which removed the preclearance requirement under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, counties across the United States began closing polling places.217 Follow-
ing the Court’s decision, Kemp sent a memo to local election officials in Georgia 
encouraging them to begin planning consolidation of precincts and polling places 
and offering guidance on how to do so.218 The only mention of voting rights in 
his six-page memo is the following sentence, which appears twice: “As a result 
of the Shelby vs. Holder Supreme Court decision, you are no longer required to 
submit [precinct or polling place] changes to the Department of Justice for pre-
clearance.”219  
According to a report by the Leadership Conference Education Fund, Georgia 
counties responded by closing 214 polling places.220 In Georgia, “[e]ighteen 
counties closed more than half of their polling places, and several closed almost 
[ninety] percent.”221 Among U.S. counties, the five that closed the most polling 
places following the Court’s decision were all in Georgia.222 According to the 
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report, the top three counties in Georgia were Lumpkin (eighty-nine percent 
closed); Stephens (eighty-eight percent closed); and Warren (eighty-three per-
cent closed); Bacon County and Butts County tied just below, with eighty percent 
closed. 223 Voters in seven Georgia counties now have only one polling site, 
which is expected to serve people over hundreds of square miles.224 For example, 
after closing the majority of its precincts in 2016, rural Lumpkin County only 
had one polling place to serve the 284-square mile county during the 2018 elec-
tion.225 Additionally, Lanier County, a 200-square mile county, closed 75 percent 
of its polling places, leaving the county’s voters with one polling place during 
the 2018 election.226 
 
ii. Long Lines on Election Day 
 
The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies reported that long lines 
deterred approximately 730,000 Americans from voting in the 2012 elections.227  
These long lines can be caused by a jurisdiction’s lack of capacity to deal with 
the amount of voters or they can be caused by unexpected events, such as a power 
outages, sick poll workers, or broken voting machines.228 Often, precincts with 
large numbers of registered voters lack an adequate amount of check-in stations 
or voting booths to handle the volume of voters assigned to the precinct.229 Ac-
cording to voting rights advocates, long lines present three main problems in U.S. 
elections: “they discourage voting, lower voter confidence, and impose eco-
nomic costs on voters.”230  
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Wait times of more than an hour were a common hurdle facing voters across 
the state during Georgia’s 2018 election.231 Long lines plagued several Gwinnett 
County voting locations and resulted in extended voting hours at multiple pre-
cincts.232 Machines temporarily went down in at least four of the county’s voting 
locations, causing voters to resort to paper ballots.233 At Gwinnett County’s An-
derson Livsey Elementary School in Snellville, voters were left waiting after the 
batteries died in each of the voting machines, which were not connected to power 
cords.234 According to one voter, it took about an hour and forty-five minutes for 
election officials to retrieve the power cords.235 Voting machine issues caused 
even longer lines at busy polling locations, resulting in some voters waiting more 
than four hours to vote.236 
In Fulton County, at least three precincts had to stay open as late as 10:00 p.m. 
due to extreme lines resulting from a limited number of voting machines.237 Ful-
ton County’s Pittman Park Recreation Center had only three machines, which 
sparked complaints from voters who waited in line for hours.238 A precinct is 
supposed to have one machine for every 350 registered voters.239 According to 
Fulton County Election Director Rick Barron, the number of voters entered into 
the system in Fulton County was incorrect, leading to far fewer machines than 
necessary actually being set up; Barron apologized to voters for the mix-up.240  
Georgia’s election officials explained that the lack of voting machines com-
bined with high turnout and wordy constitutional amendments on the ballot 
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created some of the longest lines in years.241 At the time of the 2018 elections, 
hundreds of Georgia’s voting machines were sequestered by local officials be-
cause of an ongoing federal lawsuit determining whether the state’s electronic 
voting machines could be hacked.242 On Election Day, there were about 1,050 
voting machines in Cobb County precincts while 550 were sequestered; another 
700 machines were out of service in Fulton County and 585 in DeKalb County.243 
Some argue that voting machines being held back was a contributing factor to 
the long lines, along with high turnout.244 
A study of 3,119 polling places across the United States (representing 3.3% of 
all Election Day voters) conducted by the Bipartisan Policy Center, a D.C.-based 
think tank, and MIT, revealed that on average, voters in Georgia had a wait time 
of 21.7 minutes in 2018—2.5 times the national average of 8.7 minutes.245 Data 
from that study indicated that “policy decisions in certain states cause or exacer-
bate many of the longest lines and have led to long lines for years.”246 Many have 
argued that these voting issues and long wait times represent excessive burdens 
on the right to vote. 
 
IV. DO GEORGIA’S 2018 MIDTERM ELECTION PROCEDURES VIOLATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
 
The right to vote falls under Article 25(b) of the ICCPR. According to the 
HRC, “[a]ny conditions which apply to the exercise of the rights protected by 
[A]rticle 25 should be based on objective and reasonable criteria.”247 Although 
the ICCPR does not define what constitutes objective or reasonable criteria, the 
historical background of Article 25 and the HRC’s interpretations when expand-
ing on the meaning of the ICCPR provide clarity in determining whether Geor-
gia’s election procedures violate international law and how the United States can 
best ensure its future compliance with the ICCPR.248 
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A. Are the Restrictions Used in Georgia Reasonable? 
 
Based on previous HRC decisions involving restrictions on the right to vote, 
the election procedures used during Georgia’s 2018 General Election creating 
voter registration issues are likely reasonable restrictions on the right to vote 
under the ICCPR based on United States court decisions finding the procedures 
constitutional under domestic law; however, procedures that created voter access 
issues likely constitute unreasonable restrictions on the right to vote under the 
ICCPR.  
 
i. Voter Registration Issues 
 
In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the U.S. Supreme Court examined 
the state of Ohio’s process of removing eligible voters from registration lists and 
held that the purging process did not constitute a violation of U.S. law.249 The 
Court explained that although the process does use failure to vote as a trigger for 
removal, the failure to vote is not the sole basis for removal; therefore, removing 
eligible voters does not violate U.S. law.250 The HRC may decide that Georgia’s 
removal statute puts the United States in violation of international law under the 
ICCPR even if the statute does not violate U.S. law under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Husted.  
A 2005 HRC decision regarding the removal of an eligible voter suggests that 
a cited “motivation or court decision” could convince the HRC to rule that re-
moval of a voter or group of voters is reasonable.251 In Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, 
the HRC reviewed the complaint of an individual who was arrested and later 
notified by mail that his name had been removed from the register of electors in 
the country of Cameroon until such time he could produce a “certificate of reha-
bilitation.”252 The individual’s name was removed because of his “judicial ante-
cedent.”253 In its decision, the HRC stated:  
[T]he [HRC] is of the view that exercise of the right to vote and 
to stand for election is dependent on the name of the person 
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concerned being included in the register of voters. If the author’s 
name is not on the register of voters or is removed from the reg-
ister, he cannot exercise his right to vote or stand for election. In 
the absence of any explanations from the State party, the [HRC] 
notes that the author’s name was arbitrarily removed from the 
voters’ list, without any motivation or court decision. The very 
fact of removal of the author’s name from the register of voters 
may therefore constitute denial of his right to vote and to stand 
for election in accordance with [A]rticle 25 (b) of the [ICCPR].254  
In absence of any explanation from Cameroon, the HRC concluded that the 
individual’s name was arbitrarily removed from the voters’ list, without being 
prompted by any motivation or court decision.255 The HRC explained that alt-
hough the individual received a letter informing him of the removal of his name 
from the register of voters, a procedure the decision suggests complies with Cam-
eroon’s current electoral law, the justification for that measure was his “judicial 
antecedent”—despite the expungement of his criminal conviction based on his 
absence from the country when the offense was committed.256 Because Came-
roon failed to submit any objective and reasonable grounds to justify the depri-
vation of the individual’s right to vote and to be elected, the HRC concluded that 
the removal of the individual’s name from the voters’ register constituted a vio-
lation of his rights under Article 25(b) of the ICCPR, despite the procedure’s 
compliance with Cameroon’s electoral laws.257 This decision demonstrates the 
HRC’s willingness to find that a procedure violates international law under the 
ICCPR despite its compliance with domestic law. However, the decision also 
suggests that the HRC may deem Georgia’s removal of eligible voters prior to 
the 2018 election a reasonable restriction of the right to vote based on the United 
States’ ability to point to Husted as a court decision justifying removal of voters. 
For a removal of voters from the roll to be valid under the ICCPR, the voters 
must share a common trait that constitutes objective and reasonable criteria on 
which the United States may justify deprivation of the citizens’ right to vote. 
Depending on the reason for removal, the citizens’ commonality is either (1) 
their failure to vote and subsequent failure to respond to a mailer or (2) the mis-
match of information on their voter application and information on file with the 
state. While the HRC may decide that neither of these common traits represents 
an objective and reasonable criterion on which the country may be permitted to 
deprive the right to vote, the HRC would likely rule that Georgia’s voter purge 
procedures do not constitute a violation of international law under the ICCPR 
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based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Husted and the HRC’s decision 
in Gorji-Dinka. 
 
ii. Voter Access Issues 
 
If U.S. citizens were able to submit individual complaints to the HRC, the 
HRC would likely find that the voter access issues in Georgia during the 2018 
election caused the United States to be in violation of the ICCPR under Article 
25. The HRC would likely find that Georgia’s polling place closures and lack of 
usable voting machines on Election Day in 2018 placed an excessive burden on 
voters who lived in certain counties. These voters arguably faced an unreasona-
ble restriction on their right to vote in the 2018 election because in order to place 
their votes, many Georgians had to travel long distances to polling places and 
stand in lines for hours (and potentially face registration issues upon reaching the 
front of the line).  
Although the HRC has not considered any comparable complaints, it would 
likely find that the voter access issues in Georgia violate international human 
rights norms by disproportionately overburdening eligible Georgia voters in cer-
tain counties. The HRC’s decision would hinge on its determination of whether 
polling places in Georgia are being closed based on reasonable and objective 
criteria. Because Georgia has not yet presented reasonable and objective criteria 
on which they base precinct closures and because long lines and voting machine 
problems deterred hundreds of thousands of eligible voters (primarily in popu-
lous Georgia counties) from casting their ballots in 2018, the HRC would likely 
rule that Georgia’s practice of closing precincts and failure to provide enough 
functional voting machines on Election Day constitutes an unreasonable re-
striction on people’s right to vote based on the county in which they live.  
 
B. Should the United States Act to Ensure Georgia’s Compliance with the 
ICCPR? 
 
The United States should work to ensure Georgia’s compliance with the 
ICCPR in order for the United States to play a leading role in setting and pro-
moting human rights norms. When the U.S. Senate discussed ratification of the 
ICCPR in 1992, Senator Claiborne Pell stated, “[t]he rights guaranteed by the 
[ICCPR] are the cornerstones of a democratic society. By ratifying the [ICCPR] 
now, we have an opportunity to promote democratic rights and freedoms and the 
rule of law in the former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe[,] and other areas 
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where democracy is taking hold.”258 The United States took advantage of the 
opportunity to ratify the ICCPR, putting the country in position to serve as a 
leader in the realm of international human rights law; however, the country’s 
violation of Article 25 of the ICCPR, based on the state of Georgia’s unreasona-
ble restrictions on its citizens’ right to vote, worsens the country’s position as an 
international human rights leader.  
 
V. HOW TO ENSURE GEORGIA’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
LAW UNDER THE ICCPR 
 
Although Georgia drew the greatest national attention for voter suppression 
tactics during the 2018 midterm elections, similar trends of voter suppression 
tactics and election issues can be seen across the United States.259 As a result, 
“American democracy finds itself at a crossroads, and a future where more sup-
pression is the norm seems like a strong possibility.”260 The United States de-
clared that its federal law generally complies with the provisions of the ICCPR, 
as it did prior to the country’s becoming a party to the ICCPR, because the U.S. 
Constitution and laws of the states protect the individual rights and freedoms 
protected by the ICCPR.261 The current process of State reporting under the 
ICCPR, however, does not adequately ensure each U.S. state’s compliance with 
the ICCPR.  
International and regional judicial institutions offer little recourse to Ameri-
cans who claim a violation of their human rights. The HRC’s lack of adequate 
information on the laws of each U.S. state, the lack of an individual complaint 
mechanism, and the United States’ resistance to HRC judgments present signif-
icant obstacles for Americans who wish to file a complaint with the HRC alleg-
ing that their human rights have been violated. The HRC would likely find that 
the voting access procedures affecting Georgia’s 2018 elections, but not the 
state’s voter registration procedures, unreasonably restricted eligible voters’ 
ability to exercise their right to vote. Because the United States has not ratified 
the first optional protocol to allow individual complaints, however, the burden 
of rectifying the United States’ violation of the ICCPR will likely fall on the 
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federal, state, and local governments, as well as the civil society actors within 
the United States. 
 
A. Federal Government Recommendations 
 
In order to ensure the state of Georgia’s compliance with the human right 
guarantees under the ICCPR, the U.S. federal government should more closely 
monitor each state’s election procedures and more accurately report potential re-
strictions on the right to vote to the HRC. The federal government should take 
action to ensure that local governments are informed about and uphold their ob-
ligations under the ICCPR. The federal government should adopt measures to 
make the procedures for voting, removing voters from registration lists, and clos-
ing polling places objective, reasonable, and uniform throughout the country. 
Furthermore, the federal government should work with the state and local gov-
ernments to provide resources necessary to protect the right to vote. The ICCPR 
would better protect rights of Americans under international law if Congress 
were to implement legislation guaranteeing the rights contained in the ICCPR 
under U.S. federal law.262 If the rights contained in the ICCPR were guaranteed 
under U.S. federal law, violations of the rights would be more easily challenged, 
and any contrary state laws would be preempted. 
The Carter Center has reviewed decisions and interpretations of the ICCPR 
and released an Election Obligations and Standards Manual (“Manual”) to help 
State parties implement the rights guaranteed under Article 25 of the ICCPR. The 
Manual explains the right and opportunity to vote guaranteed under the ICCPR 
and details potentially unreasonable restrictions, such as restrictions based on 
national or social origin,263 language,264 sex,265 religion,266 birth or other sta-
tus,267 and economic circumstances.268 The U.S. federal government should re-
view this Manual, disperse its contents or a similar guide to each state govern-
ment, and communicate the federal government’s expectations for state 
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compliance with the ICCPR. If the United States begins following the guidance 
in this Manual and the 2014 and 2015 HRC report guidance, the country could 
better ensure compliance with the treaty’s guarantees. The new HRC reporting 
guidelines, which took effect in 2020, will likely also help ensure the United 
States’ compliance with the ICCPR by simplifying the reporting process and en-
abling the HRC to clearly communicate its principal areas of concern. 
To realize the country’s goal of being a leader in setting international human 
rights standards, the U.S. federal government should coordinate with other State 
parties to create an independent electoral monitoring body to ensure that each 
member State’s federal and state elections comply with the guarantees of Article 
25. Previously, the HRC has suggested that parties establish an independent elec-
toral monitoring body and that restrictions on campaign finance and outside elec-
tion observers might help in securing genuine elections.269  
 
B. State and Local Government Recommendations 
 
State legislatures within the United States are in the best position to ensure 
that their state’s election laws comply with international law under Article 25 of 
the ICCPR. U.S. state governments bear the responsibility of changing and up-
dating their state’s laws to continually ensure compliance with international hu-
man rights norms. To increase turnout in U.S. elections and decrease instances 
of long lines at polling places, civil society actors should consider closing schools 
and places of work on election days. Cancelling school on election days would 
enable public schools to serve as additional polling places, while cancelling work 
would reduce work-related impediments to voting. It is already the practice in 
Fulton County and Cobb County to cancel school on election day; other Georgia 
counties should consider following their lead.270 Cancelling school on election 
day also provides parents the opportunity to take their child to the polling place, 
and a parent’s demonstration of the importance of civic involvement early in his 
or her child’s life could lead to long-term increased participation in and enthusi-
asm about voting in Georgia. 
The problem of long lines at polling places can be improved if the number of 
voters reporting to each polling place is reduced,271 the number of service points 
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is increased,272 and the average transaction time is reduced.273 To combat issues 
of long wait times at polling places, state “election officials should collect infor-
mation about the number of people in line on a regular basis at every polling 
place in their jurisdiction.”274 Essential to identifying problems and finding so-
lutions is the proper documentation of line lengths on an hourly basis.275 Leading 
up to an election, officials should assess whether the resources devoted to polling 
places, such as poll books, poll workers, ballots, and voting machines, are ade-
quate to handle the quantity of voters expected on Election Day. On Election 
Day, election officials must measure lines and document wait times in order to 
see whether the pre-election plans were adequate and to understand where any 
unanticipated problems might emerge. After Election Day, they should reassess 
their previous plans in anticipation of the next election. 
Georgia’s state government could implement same-day voter registration to 
help fix potential voter registration and access issues. Although bills to add same-
day registration in Georgia have been introduced in Georgia’s State House of 
Representatives over a dozen times since 2011, none have passed.276 Ensuring 
that eligible voters are able to rectify issues with their voter registration at the 
polls just prior to voting would serve the purpose of Article 25 of the ICCPR by 
protecting the right to vote for eligible Georgia voters who were mistakenly or 
incorrectly purged from the voter list. Georgia’s state legislature should also 
work with local governments across the state to provide information from the 
federal government and collect information regarding the number of voters in 
each precinct across the state so that Georgia is able to appropriately disperse its 
usable voting machines.  
Finally, local governments should take steps to enforce the rights guaranteed 
under the ICCPR. Local governments have taken action to enforce rights guar-
anteed under international law in multiple U.S. cities already. For example, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.277 Using this city’s decision as guidance, local governments should act 
to enforce the provisions of Article 25 of the ICCPR through implementation 
into local law, so far as it does not conflict with existing state law. Additionally, 
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local governments should work with state governments to compile better data on 
the number of voters reporting to each precinct on Election Day during each 
election cycle. 
 
C. Civil Society Recommendations 
 
Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are encouraged to participate 
whenever the HRC considers a State party’s compliance with the treaty. The 
HRC relies on reports from NGOs to provide clarity and potential arguments 
against information submitted by the government.278 NGOs can help ensure the 
United States’ compliance with the ICCPR by “documenting and providing in-
formation about civil and political rights violations in their states and communi-
ties, organizing local events, [and] publishing materials that raise public aware-
ness.”279 
NGOs should promote the scrutiny and assessment of the United States in light 
of its international commitments under the ICCPR. In order to do so, groups 
should call public attention to the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR and to any 
steps that U.S. citizens can take to ensure that the country makes tangible ad-
vances in joining the international system for protection of human rights.280 
Groups should urge the HRC to establish clear standards for democratic and rep-
resentative government.281 Specifically, groups should ask the HRC to provide a 
clear definition of the term “genuine elections” by releasing a new or revised 
General Comment on Article 25 of the ICCPR. Finally, NGOs could urge the 
U.S. federal government to sign onto the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, which 
would enable U.S. citizens to submit complaints against the United States to the 
HRC claiming that their political rights guaranteed under Article 25 have not 
been or are not being protected.282 
Individuals may also act to call public attention to the United States’ obliga-
tion to ensure that an individual’s right to vote is protected under the ICCPR. For 
example, in order to reduce each state’s ability to purge eligible voters, commu-
nities should organize to ensure that local election registrars, who control the 
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rolls and have the final say on most purges, are aware of voters’ concerns.283 
Moreover, voting experts should work to verify or debunk the federal admin-
istration’s claims of voter fraud; attorneys should continue to wage legal battles 
against unreasonable restrictions; and local politicians should stand firm against 




Upon the ICCPR’s ratification by the United States, the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations issued a report, recommending that Congress ratify the treaty 
and stating two goals: (1) to “remove doubts about the seriousness of the U.S. 
commitment to human rights” and (2) to “strengthen the impact of U.S. efforts 
in the human rights field.”285 In order to remove doubts about the country’s com-
mitment to international human rights, the U.S. federal, state, and local govern-
ments, along with civil society actors, should call public attention to the existence 
of the ICCPR, the United States’ obligations as a party to it, and the importance 
of ensuring each U.S. state’s compliance with the treaty’s guarantees. 
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